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SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS IN JOINT ACCOUNTS
A common belief among laymen is that opening a joint account with
right of survivorship entitles the named co-tenant to the funds remaining
in the account at the death of the depositor., Until recently, the Statute of

Wills 2 often thwarted the layman's expectations,3 and still may if the ac-

count was created before 197 1.4 Litigation concerning survivorship in joint
accounts frequently involves the actions and interests of three parties: (1) the
depositor, deceased at the time of litigation, who established the joint account; (2) the survivor named as the depositor's co-tenant upon the opening
of the account and asserting ownership over the funds upon the depositor's
death; and (3) the depositor's executor claiming the funds as part of the
decedent's estate.
To eliminate uncertainties surrounding survivorship rights, two statutes
were recently enacted by the Florida Legislature. 5 This note analyzes the
status of three distinct kinds of accounts emerging after these statutory
enactments: (1) savings accounts in certain savings and loan associations
opened after 1965; (2) other bank accounts opened prior to 1971; and (3)
other bank accounts opened after 1971.
JOINT SAVINGs ACCOUNTS IN CERTAIN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

In 1965 the Florida Legislature made the opening of a joint "savings
share account or investment share account" conclusive evidence of the intention of the depositor to vest title in the survivors of the account.6
Although the reasons underlying the enactment of this statute were unclear/

1.

See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 221 (1962).
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960). Additionally, many depositors open joint accounts under the mistaken belief that the property will not be subject to estate and inheritance taxes. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 1, at 221.
While the tax consequences of creating a joint account are beyond the scope of this note,
the case of Harley A. Wilson, 56 T.C. 579 (1971), may prove useful in illustrating possible
tax considerations. A mother had opened a joint account with right of survivorship with
each of her children. The issue before the court was whether the opening of the account
constituted a completed gift inter vivos subject only to the gift tax or merely a transfer of
a joint interest in the account, which would be subject to estate tax under §2040 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The court found the decedent had relinquished only a

present equal right to withdraw all funds on deposit and therefore held the funds remaining in the account upon his death fully includable in her gross estate. For a discussion
of the tax aspects of joint accounts see Efland,

Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 WVis.

L. REv. 507; Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and Otherwise, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 501 (1952).
4. In 1971 the Florida Legislature enacted §659.271 of the Florida Statutes, which has
superseded the Statute of Wills with respect to joint bank accounts. However, the statute
was not made retroactive and thus the Florida Satute of Wills is still viable with respect
to accounts opened prior to 1971. See text accompanying note 153 infra.
5. FLA. STAT. §665.271 (1969), amending Fla. Stat. §665.15 (2) (1965); Fla. Laws 1971,
ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166.
6. Fla. Stat. §665.15 (2) (1965), as amended, FLA. STAT. §665.271 (1969).
7. In view of the context of chapter 665, entitled "Building and Loan Associations,"
the statute was apparently designed to protect only the limited number of associations
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the apparent purpose was to provide a foolproof method of circumventing
the requirements of the Statute of Wills. s Since savings associations must
comply with the statutory format9 to gain the benefit of the conclusive presumption, standard forms are presented to all prospective depositors. 0 Once
the forms have been executed and the account "maintained,"' 1 survivorship will be accorded recognition even if conclusive evidence exists that the
account was opened solely for the depositor's convenience or with testamentary intent. The risk of effecting a testamentary disposition where it was
not intended suggests the legislature must have placed great reliance on
savings associations to dearly indicate to depositors the nature of the joint
savings account.
Although the language of section 665.15(2) was broad enough to apply to
all savings accounts, the court in Graham v. Ducote Federal Credit Union 2
limited its application "only to share accounts established in building and
loan associations or federal savings and loan associations transacting business
3
in this state . . . [but not] to credit unions organized under Chapter 657.."
Such a decision seems sound under the 1965 version of the statute, for the
broad language is limited in context by the scope of chapter 665, which

within its provisions from litigation in which the associations had no stake or from double
liability where a withdrawal was allowed after the death of one party. The peculiar ele-

ment of this statute concerns the inclusion of the survivors in the conclusive presumption.
The rights of individuals seem out of context in this chapter and thus, at least initially,
would be obscure to the general practitioner.
8. See Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So. 2d 603, 609 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968),
where the court interpreted the effect of this section as establishing a "conclusive presumption of the right of survivorship in joint share accounts." There is a serious question as to
whether this result would be reached under the present wording of the statute, for the
conclusive presumption is directed only to the intent of the parties to vest title in the
survivors, which is in effect an intent to make a testamentary disposition. The showing of
such intention is clearly insufficient to satisfy the requirements of valid testamentary dispositions and thus may be found invalid. See Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127
So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960) (testamentary intent insufficient to effectuate a valid testamentary
disposition); FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1969).
9. FLA. STAT. §665.271 (1969) requires the account to be made "payable to either or
the survivor" before the conclusive presumption will be applied.
10. Reliance on standard forms is, of course, quite questionable under most circumstances. Patrons may not read the "fine print." Moreover, reading does not assure understanding. Reliance on bank employees informing prospective clients of the legal effect
of the account is a poor substitute.
11. See FLA. STAT. §665.271 (1969), amending Fla. Stat. §665.15 (2) (1965) to read in
part: "Accounts in two or more names.-When a savings account is maintained in any
association or federal association in the names of two or more persons . . . in such form
that the moneys in the account are payable to either or the survivor or survivors then,
in the absence of fraud or undue influence, such account and all additions thereto shall
be the property of such persons as joint tenants ....
The opening of the account in such
form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence in any
action or proceeding to which either the association or the survivor or survivors is a party,
of the intention of all of the parties to the account to vest title to such account and the
additions thereto in such survivor or survivors." (Emphasis added.)
12. 213 So. 2d 603 (Ist D.CA. Ila. 1968).

13. Id. at 609.
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deals with "Building and Loan Associations." A 1969 amendment brought
all savings accounts in any state or federal savings association or savings
and loan association within the statute, 14 but did not include savings accounts in banking institutions.
A recent case illustrated the actions required to come within the purview
of the statute. In Wood v. McClellan-5 a father secured, signed, and executed
forms for a joint savings account in a savings and loan association at his
daughter's suggestion, while she was managing his estate. The daughter
delivered these forms to the association but was informed that the father's
funds, to be used in opening the joint account, should be left in his separate
account for an additional month in order that the semi-annual interest
accrue. Fulfilling her fiduciary duties, the daughter agreed to leave the funds
in the single account. Her father died shortly before the new account was to
be "officially" opened. The court assumed that the delay transpired at the
instruction or with the consent of the father and held that the alleged donee
"must show by clear and satisfactory evidence every element . . . requisite
to constitute a gift."'0 This harsh result decisively demonstrates the statutory
requirement that the account be "opened" and "maintained" before the
conclusive presumption can be invoked.14. FLA. STAT. §665.021 (1) (1969) states: "'Association' shall mean a savings association
or savings and loan association subject to the provisions of this chapter." Chapter 665 is
now referred to as the "Savings Association Act," which also may indicate the intention of
a broader application.
15. 247 So. 2d 77 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
16. Id. at 78. The effect of this "assumption" was to create a presumption the reverse
of the one created in Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956). See text accompanying
notes 54-63 infra.
17. One final case should be briefly considered in interpreting this statute. Brees v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 217 So. 2d 334 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969), involved the rights
of an association rather than the rights of individuals and concerned events transpiring
prior to the death of either party. The association, apparently in an attempt to inform its
patrons of the legal consequences of their act, inserted a clause in its standard form to
the effect that the deposit would be conclusive evidence of a gift. The terms of the signature card contained the following language: "It is agreed by the signatory parties with
each other and by the parties with you [the association] that any funds placed in or added
to the account by any one of the parties are and shall be conclusively intended to be a
gift and delivery at that time of such funds to the other signatory party or parties to the
extent of his or their pro rata interest in the account." Id. at 335 (emphasis supplied by the
court). Sometime after the creation of the account, the noncontributing co-tenant withdrew
all funds on deposit. The depositor's guardian sued the association for the amount withdrawn. Rather than attempting to use the express statutory language, the court chose to
uphold the bank's surrender of the funds under a contract theory. The rejection of the
statute is sound because the provision is directed to the rights of the bank and survivors,
and thus would not be controlling until the death of one of the co-tenants.
Such a view seems to have been followed by Justice Cardozo in his interpretation of a
similar New York statute: "When a bank account [or savings account] is opened in the
form prescribed by statute . . . a presumption at once arises that the interest of the
depositors is that of joint tenants. Upon the death of one of the depositors, this presumption becomes conclusive in favor of the survivor in respect of any moneys then left in
the account. It continues to be a mere presumption in respect of any moneys previously
withdrawn." Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N.Y. 219, 221, 174 N.E. 460 (1931).
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While the enactment in 1971 of section 659.291 of the Florida Statutes
has dramatically changed the law of joint accounts of the type described
herein, the statute was not made retroactive. Therefore, accounts opened
before July 1, 1971, are subject to the case law set forth in this section.
Development of the Right of Survivorship
In order to justify the survivor's right to funds remaining in a joint
account where the requirements of the Statute of Wills have not been met,
courts have utilized a number of inter vivos theories. Any or all -of the
theories may be utilized to determine the survivor's rights, but each will be
considered upon facts and circumstances surrounding the opening of the
account.
Joint Tenancy Theory. Originally, in the formation of any joint estate
in real or personal property, each tenant would come into possession simultaneously and each would have the right to alienate only his interest in the
jointly held property.' These characteristics, expressed by the courts in
terms of four unities - interest, time, title, and possession 19 were presumed
to exist under common law in any conveyance to two or more persons, provided the parties were not husband and wife. 20 The doctrine of survivorship 2' was developed to vest title absolutely in the survivor of the -estate by
22
operation of law upon the death of his co-tenant.
Due to the inequities inherent in the automatic application of survivorship to all joint conveyances, many state legislatures, 2 including that of
Florida,24 attempted to abolish this doctrine by requiring survivorship to be
expressly stated in the creating instrument. Florida courts interpreted this
The contract theory relied on by the court in Brees raises some questions as to the rights
of one co-tenant against the other. Presumably the agreement would not be binding as
between these parties, because there is no mutuality or consideration. See 1 A. CORaIN,
CoNTRACTs §§133, 152 (1963). Consequently, some other theory must be used to determine
the rights of the parties.
18. G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §1775 (repl. 1961) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON];
2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAw oF REAL PROPERTY §421 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as
TIFFANY].
19. E.g., Weed v. Knox, 157 Fla. 896, 27 So. 2d 419 (1946); Andrews v. Andrews, 155
Fla. 654, 21 So. 2d 205 (1945); Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); Appeal of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 A. 459, cert. denied, 274 U.S. 759 (1927); Jenkins v. Meyer,
380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964); Methodist Church v. First Nat'i Bank, 125 Vt. 124, 211 A.2d
168 (1965).
20. 4 THOMPSON §1775 (1961). See also 1 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANsACnroNs
§20.01 (1) (1971) [hereinafter cited as BoYER]; 2 TIFFANY §421 (1939). For a discussion of
conveyances involving husband and wife see text accompanying notes 109-136 infra.
21. 4 THOMPSON §1776 (1961); 2 TIFFANY §419 (1939).
22. See Florida Nat'l Bank v. Gann, 101 So. 2d 579 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1958).
23. For a list of these jurisdictions see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 247 (1948).
24. FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1969). See generally 1 BoYER §20.01 (1) (1969).
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statutory proclamation as merely abolishing the doctrine of survivorship by
operation of law, 25 thus allowing the creator of a joint estate to effect a pre-

sumption of survivorship by expressing his intention of survivorship in
writing.
The finding of survivorship was further limited by courts that required
all unities to be present before finding a joint tenancy sufficient to support
survivorship.26 Confusion was injected, however, when the joint tenancy
theory was applied, at least nominally, to cases in which the unities did not
exist. For example, the court in Johnson v. Landefeld27 upheld the existence
of a joint tenancy in realty, and consequently the right of survivorship,
where it appeared the depositer intended to create that estate, even though
the unities of time and title were absent.28 This view eventually led the Florida
supreme court to hold that the intent to create the right of survivorship
29
could be substituted for the unity requirements in creating a joint tenancy.
Gift Theory. The gift theory historically required a concurrence of all
elements of gift inter vivos: (1) surrender of dominion over the subject matter absolutely by the donor; (2) delivery to the donee; (3) acceptance by the
donee; and (4) donative intent on the part of the donor.30 Technically,
joint accounts never satisfy these requirements because the donor invariably
retains some "control and beneficial interest" in the account and consequently, legal title is not presently conveyed absolutely to the donee. 31 The transaction takes the form of a revocable gift, particularly where the donor retains
the power to withdraw the entire amount. In order32for a revocable gift to be
valid, however, it must satisfy the Statute of Wills.
The failure to surrender complete control was eventually circumvented
by an analogy to real estate transactions between husband and wife in which
the conveyance was viewed as a gift of a part interest in the entire estate and
thus not measured by the rules governing gifts inter vivos. 33 While the
foundation of the analogy is through presumptions associated with husband
and wife, 34 the resulting exception has been applied to other circumstances

25.

Florida Nat'l Bank v. Gann, 101 So. 2d 579

THOMPSON

§1775

(1961); 2 TIFFANY §421

(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See also 4

(1939).

26. See I BoYER §20.01 (1) (1969).
27. 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
28. See also Neal v. Neal, 194 Ark. 226, 106 S.W.2d 595 (1937); Heard v. Gurdy, 127
Me. 480, 144 A. 399 (1929). For a list of other jurisdictions see Annot., I A.L.R.2d 247 (1948).
29. LaPierre v. Kalergis, 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971); Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307,
311 (Fla. 1956); Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So. 2d 484, 487 (Fla. 1952). See also Neal v. Neal,
194 Ark. 226, 106 S.W.2d 595 (1937); Heard v. Gurdy, 127 Me. 480, 144 A. 339 (1929).
30. See, e.g., McKinnon v. First Nat'l Bank, 77 Fla. 777, 82 So. 748 (1919). See also
Jones v. Ferguson, 150 Fla. 313, 7 So. 2d 464 (1942).
31. Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400 (1945).
32. FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1969). But cf. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-126, §689.075 (2), at 323, allowing revocable trusts under certain situations.
33. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
34. See text accompanying notes 109-114 infra.
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without distinction.35 Nevertheless, the relinquishment of some present con36
trol was required to satisfy this theory.
Trust Theory. While originally some consideration was given to finding
the existence of an implied trust where joint ownership failed to meet both
gift and joint tenancy requirements, 37 Florida courts have uniformly rejected
the trust theory unless the deposit documents contain language from which
the presumption of an intent to create a trust might flow.38
Florida's adoption of the "Totten trust" doctrine3 9 may affect the joint
ownership area, at least by analogy. Under this doctrine a settlor may establish a revocable trust in which he retains complete control over the funds
during his life and still have the trust deemed valid and irrevocable upon
his death. The Totten trust thus constitutes a clear exception to the Statute
of Wills and no longer involves the establishment of a "present executed
gift of the equitable title without reference to its taking effect at some future
time"0 required under the earlier view. While the analogy presents strong
similarities to the joint ownership area, the requisite intent to establish a
trust for the use and benefit of another41 still prevents its direct application
to joint accounts.
Contract Theory. It is arguable that a deposit in a financial institution
in the name of the depositor and another with right of survivorship creates a
contract between the depositor and the bank for the benefit of the noncontributing owner of the account. 42 Hence although the surviving owner's rights
in the account may not be supported by joint tenancy, gift, or trust theory,
some states have allowed the survivor to prevail as a third-party beneficiary
of the contract.43 This interpretation, in effect, constitutes an exception to
the Statute of Wills. Florida, however, has rejected the concept at least

35. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Walters v. Nevis, 31 Cal. App. 511, 160 P. 1081 (1st Dist. 1916); Murphy
v. Haynes, 197 Ky. 444, 247 S.W. 362 (1923).
38. "For the purpose of proving the trust relationship the evidence must be clear and
unmistakable both as to the intent to create the trust and as to the execution of that intent."
Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 418, 20 So. 2d 400, 403 (1945).
See also Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
39. Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956). This doctrine was liberalized by
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-126, §689.075 (2), at 323. See also Litsey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 243 So. 2d 239 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
40. Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 418, 20 So. 2d 400,
403 (1945).
41. Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956).
42. See, e.g., Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Bennett v. Bennett,
70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1942); cf. Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So.

2d 777 (1943).
43. See, e.g., Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1943); DePasqua v. Bergstedt, 335 Mass. 734, 247 N.E.2d 354 (1969); Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d
48 (1962).
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where the elements of a gift have not been satisfied. 44 Moreover, the contract to be valid, must expressly provide for survivorship,5 and the survivor
must prove that it was the intention of the depositor, not just the bank, to
include the survivorship clause. 4 6 Thus, it seems unlikely the contract theory
can be asserted by a survivor in Florida to extend his rights beyond those
allowed under the joint tenancy or gift theories.
Judicial Application Before 1956
Florida case law suggests that only the joint tenancy and gift theories
actually furnished the noncontributing survivor with an effective means of
asserting his right to the funds upon the death of the depositor. The joint
tenancy theory provided the easiest method of establishing the survivor's
rights, for all that courts deemed necessary were:
(1) the opening of a joint account with the intent to provide the
7
right of survivorship4
48
(2) the inclusion of a survivorship clause in the creating instrument;
9
(3) an intention on the part of the depositor to include that clause;4
0
(4) some access to the account by the survivor5
Whether the depositor intended to bestow more than a mere power of attorney in his co-tenant during his life was immaterial to the question of
survivorship. 51 Under the gift theory, however, there must have been a pres52
ent surrender to the co-tenant of some control over the funds on deposit.
Spark Theory v. Sullivan Theory
Two cases have revolutionized the area of joint bank accounts 53 In
Spark v. Canny54 a mother opened a joint account in a savings and loan
association in the names of herself and her daughter "or the survivor." 55

44. Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400 (1945).
45. Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So. 2d 777 (1943).
46. Id. The court makes reference to Fla. Stat. §653.16 (1941), as amended, FLA. STAT.
§659.29 (1969), of the Banking Code, which requires the bank to provide for survivorship
in the certificate of deposit to protect itself from double liability should payment be made
to one party after the death of the other. See, e.g., Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The
Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 103 (1953).
47. Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1952).
48. FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1969).
49. Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So. 2d 777 (1943).
50. Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400
(1945).
51. Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1952) (upholding survivorship although
the stated purpose of the creation of the account was only to transfer funds to the survivor
upon the death of the creator).
52. Cf. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
53. See Namack, Survivorship Bank Accounts in Florida, 41 FLA. B.J. 246 (1967).
54. 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956).
55. Id. at 309.
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Four months after opening the account the mother died and shortly thereafter the daughter transferred the remaining funds to her own account. The
transfer was attacked by the legatees of the decedent's estate on the ground
that the account was originally created solely for convenience- 8 and thus
the daughter should not be accorded the right of survivorship. Under the
contract and joint tenancy theories the daughter asserted survivorship rights.
The court observed that the opening of a joint account with right of survivorship had heretofore been sufficient to establish a joint estate notwithstanding the possible absence of donative intent.57 Nevertheless, the court
stated that while a joint account cannot comply with all requirements of
gifts inter vivos:58 "[W]e think that the third essential of a gift inter vivos that of donative intent - is just as relevant to the question here under discussion as it is in cases involving the establishment of a bank account by a
person with his own funds in the name of another."5 9 The court stated that,
in general, donative intent must be established as a condition precedent to
the creation of a joint estate with survivorship. 60 However, it held:61
Where a joint bank account with right of survivorship is established
with funds of one person . . . a gift of the funds remaining in the
account at the death of the creator of the joint account is presumed;
but such presumption is rebuttable and may be overcome by dear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
In light of the facts adduced at trial, the court found the account had been
established for convenience and that such finding was sufficient to rebut the
presumption.
The scope of this decision is uncertain. While in this case the court found
the presumption to be rebutted by a showing that the depositor had not intended to give her daughter the right of survivorship, the question remained
whether present donative intent as opposed to testamentary intent was required. A strong argument could be made that the court would have upheld
survivorship where the depositor retained complete control during life so

56. The executor of the decedent's estate alleged: "Mt was [the decedent's] purpose
and announced intention to establish the joint account solely to enable [the survivor] to
withdraw funds to pay for [the decedent's] living and medical expenses during her last
illness and her funeral expenses after her death, with the remainder to be equally divided
among her three daughters .
Id.
57. Id. at 311.
58. "Thus, the very nature of a joint bank account is such that one essential element
of a gift inter vivos is missing-that of surrender of dominion and control by the donorsince each party has an equal right to withdraw the funds on deposit .... Nor is the
rule as to delivery of the gift applicable in this situation. This is so because the thing
given is not the money, in specie, on deposit in the joint bank account; it is a gift of an
interest in the funds on deposit equal to that of the donor." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61.

Id. at 311-12.
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long as some donative intent was shown.62 However, Webster v. St. Petersburg Federal Savings & Loan Association,63 a much earlier decision cited
in Spark, required the noncontributing co-tenant to have knowledge of the
fund. This knowledge, when considered with the form of the account, would
give the co-tenant the legal power to withdraw. Nevertheless, the depositor
could attempt to maintain control through moral restraints on the noncontributor.
Speculation as to retention of control became academic after Chase
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sullivan.64 In Sullivan the sole owner
of a savings account converted it to a joint account with the right of survivorship in the names of a friend and herself. The evidence indicated the
sole owner had converted the account as a means of effectuating a testamentary disposition and not with the intention of making a gift inter ViVos. 6 5
The court, while allegedly following the Spark theory, materially altered the
entire concept of the joint account by making all elements of gift inter vivos,
with certain modifications peculiar to the nature of a joint account, 66 essential to the establishment of survivorship:67
[W]e think there must exist an intention that each party shall have a
present, equal right to withdraw the funds . . . . In applying the
tests of a gift inter vivos . . . the rules have been modified by the

nature of a joint fund but the basic elements are the same: donative
intent, delivery - not the money, in specie, in the joint fund, but a
gift of an undivided interest in the funds, the surrender of an equal
right to withdraw the funds, and acceptance by the donee.
This view rejects the general intent argument of the Spark case in favor of
the intention to surrender a present right to withdraw. Consequently, by
attempting to restrict his co-tenant's present right to withdraw through
moral pressure, the depositor would also destroy his co-tenant's survivorship rights. While the Sullivan court upheld the existence of the presumption

62. This statement appears supportable since the court analogized its presumption with
Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956), where, in the trust setting, the settlor may
retain control over the funds during his life by retaining an unrestricted power to revoke.
Presumably, their cite to Seymour indicates the same degree of control may be retained

in a joint bank account. Cf. Crawford v. McGraw, 61 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1952).
63. 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400 (1945).
64. 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960).
65. The evidence was derived from depositions taken before trial, which indicated the
original owner wished the friend to have the balance of the account "upon her death." Id.
at 113. In the opinion written by the district court of appeal, the majority felt this was
indicative of testamentary intent only. The dissent, however, felt it was a mere expression
as to the amount the gift was to include. See Sullivan v. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119
So. 2d 78 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
66. "It is true that the essential elements relating to gifts inter vivos cannot be strictly
and literally applied because of the very nature of a joint fund." Chase Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1960).
67. Id. at 114-15 (emphasis added).
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expressed in Spark, it found the presumption rebutted by dear and convincing evidence that delivery and surrender of a present equal right to
withdraw were not intended68 Since the account failed to satisfy the Statute
of Wills, 69 survivorship was denied.
The deviation from the Spark theory unfortunately invites litigation by
allowing a claimant to contravene the depositor's express written desires to
bestow the right of survivorship on his co-tenants through a showing by
parol evidence that the depositor did not intend a present gift. As a practical
matter the Sullivan theory potentially yields a harsh result because the depositor, who has left documents expressing clear testamentary intent, has
died before the question of "present" intent arises7 0
Moreover, the Sullivan theory does not broaden the protection against
inequities inherent in providing a survivorship presumption in joint accounts for, even under Spark, the account is protected against misappropriation by the survivor if it can be shown that survivorship was included by
mistake or as a result of fraud or undue influence. 71 On the contrary, the
Sullivan theory creates inequities of its own. For example, if the depositor
is said to have testamentary intent in a given case, it is likely that he was
relying on the survivorship right in the joint account as an integral part of
his testamentary scheme. Denial of that right invokes the rigid rules of
intestate succession, thwarting his intent except in cases where the two
takers coincide. If the depositor executes a will after he established the account, he will probably exclude or adjust the co-tenant's interest in the
estate under the will by the funds to be received under his survivorship
right. By voiding the survivor's interest in the account the beneficiaries
under the will would receive more than the decedent intended at the ex72
pense of the co-owner of the account.

68. The use of "donative intent" by the Sullivan court seems to be limited to any
intention to vest some right in the donee for the court found that requirement had been
met upon the showing that the donor intended the donee to receive the funds upon her
death. However, it found: "The second and third requirements of a gift inter vivos [i.e.,
delivery and surrender of an equal right to withdraw] have not been met." Id. at 115.
69. "Therefore the establishment of a joint bank account was an ineffectual attempt to
do that which could only be accomplished by last will and testament" Id. at 114 (emphasis

supplied by the court).
70. Lower court decisions after Sullivan have used "acceptance" by the alleged donee
(evidenced by withdrawals during the existence of the joint account) as being indicative
of the depositor's "present" intent. See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra.
71. Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956) (presumption being rebuttable by contrary intent).
72. An analysis of the laws of other jurisdictions reflects several different judicial approaches to joint accounts. If a joint account is created, most jurisdictions presume an
intent to make a gift, although the force and application of the presumption vary dramatically. See Comment, Joint Bank Accounts: The Survivor's Right to Payments Due to
the Account, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 410 (1968). For example, the Idaho supreme court has held
the presumption of intent to make a gift is overcome whenever a question of the depositor's intent arises. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 Idaho 285, 340 P.2d
1094 (1959). See also In re Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 348 P.2d 473 (1960): Woodward v.
Monson, 23 Utah 2d 318, 462 P.2d 715 (1969) (Utah supreme court interpreting Idaho law).
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The Subsequent Muddle
In the lower court decisions following Spark and Sullivan no one factual
issue has been considered predominant, nor have similar circumstances been
treated uniformly.73 In most cases all forms necessary to create a joint account with right of survivorship had been executed; therefore, the Spark
presumption was applicable. However, the presumption determined the
result in only one case. 74 Most cases seem to turn on one or more of the
following questions with affirmative answers working against the survivor's
assertions: (1) Was the depositor attempting to use the joint account
solely as a method of avoiding probate? (2) Did the depositor retain conThereafter, the alleged donee must establish every element of gift by dear and convincing evidence. Illinois apparently follows Florida's view, holding that the presumption
is rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Weaver, 75 I1. App. 227, 220 N.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1966). The Wisconsin supreme
court in a landmark decision upheld the right of survivorship even though the depositor
failed to surrender any control over the funds during her lifetime. In re Michael's Estate,
26 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 557 (1965). In justifying its decision, the court observed: "Such
an account provides a useful technique for transferring property, and need not fit any of
the historical and traditional property concepts associated with the law of inter vivos gifts
and joint tenancy. It would be a mistake to ignore the deposit contract and the intent of
the parties in order to apply such concepts." Id. at 398, 132 N.W.2d at 565. The court based
its decision on a provision in the banking code [similar to FLA. STAT. §659.29 (1969)], which
permitted the bank to pass legal title to the survivor of funds remaining on deposit in a joint
account with right of survivorship. The provision was found to be in conflict with the Statute
of Wills but was held to have overriding effect. As a result, "[t]he reservation by [the depositor] of full control over the account during her lifetime, thus excluding [the donee]
from any right of withdrawal, did not invalidate the survivorship feature of the joint
account so as to make it an ineffective testamentary disposition." Id.
Massachusetts and Texas have followed this view, although their position is based on
a contract theory. See, e.g., DePasqua v. Bergstedt, 355 Mass. 734, 247 N.E.2d 354 (1969);
Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 199 N.E. 896 (1936); Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex.
545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962); Henry v. Powers, 447 S.W.2d 738 (1st Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1969).
Courts in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah have also upheld the survivorship feature even
though the account appeared to be testamentary in nature. See, e.g., Mowrey v. Jarvy, 228
Ore. 98, 363 P.2d 733 (1961); In re Edward's Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 14 P.2d 274 (1932); In re
Berdar's Estate, 404 Pa. 93, 170 A.2d 861 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 219 Pa. Super. 112, 280 A.2d
626 (1971). In Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 22, 439 P.2d 468, 471 (1968),
the court held: "If the contract between the parties ostensibly creates a joint tenancy relationship . . . there arises a presumption that such is the case unless and until some
interested party shows under equitable rules that the contract should be reformed to
show some other agreement of the parties or that the contract is not enforceable because
of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity." Accord, In re Estate of Spitters, 24 Utah
2d 372, 472 P.2d 426 (1970).
73. Moreover, courts cannot agree on what requirements are controlling. Compare
text accompanying note 67 supra, with Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So. 2d
603, 606-07 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968) and Josephson v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440 (Ist D.C.A.
Fla. 1962) (applying gift causa mortis standards to similar transactions). Furthermore, there
appears to be some confusion regarding whether the Spark presumption was created by
FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1969) or by the common law concepts of joint tenancy where survivorship has been expressed. Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So. 2d 603, 606 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Demps v. Graham, 157 So. 2d 534 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
74. Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So. 2d 603, 606 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1968).
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trol over the funds during his life? (3) Did the alleged donee fail to manifest any action of acceptance? (4) Did both parties contribute funds to the
original deposit? The first two questions are interrelated and are usually
treated together.
Courts have rarely held that an account was created solely for convenience 75 In the majority of cases the depositor possessed either present or
testamentary intent to confer some benefit on the noncontributing cotenant.7 6 The question, after Sullivan, was whether the depositor's donative
intent in opening the account was to surrender some present right to his cotenant, or to convey an interest that vested only upon the depositor's
death. Usually, events transpiring between the opening of the account and
the death of the depositor furnished the answer. For example, in Demps v.
Graham77 the chancellor determined that the depositor, although opening a
joint account, intended to retain control over the funds on deposit until her
death and thus failed to surrender an equal right to withdraw. This seems
to have been emphasized by the co-tenant's failure to withdraw funds during
the lifetime of the depositor. 78 Since no restriction appeared in the documents executed upon the establishment of the account, the court's holding
suggests that attempted moral restraint is sufficient to rebut the Spark presumption.
Moral restriction also appeared to be the basis of the decision in North
Shore Bank v. Shea70 where a priest opened a joint account with a long-time
associate. The funds were provided from a New York account in the name
of the priest individually, but over which the associate had been given a
power of attorney. Although she mistakenly-0 referred to this new right as
only a power of attorney, the associate asserted her right to withdraw as
survivor of the joint account upon the death of the priest. No withdrawal
restriction appeared in any account instrument, and the priest's intent to
bestow upon her the right of survivorship was unquestioned. Nevertheless,
the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the associate on the
ground that there existed a question of fact as to whether the deposit
constituted a gift inter vivos or an attempted testamentary transfer.8 '
In Graham v. Ducote Federal Credit Union,82 however, the court ig-

75. See Josephson v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1962).
76. See, e.g., Maier v. Bean, 189 So. 2d 880 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Demps v. Graham, 157
So. 2d 534 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963); North Shore Bank v. Shea, 148 So. 2d 60 (2d D.CA. Fla.
1963); Josephson v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1962).

77. 157 So. 2d 534 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1963).
78. The use of the account by the noncontributing party was considered significant in
Maier v. Bean, 189 So. 2d 380 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966), where a deposit by the survivor was
held to be evidence of the intent of the creator to surrender a present interest, even

though the funds deposited were in fact supplied by the creator.
79.
80.
81.
181 So.

148 So. 2d 60 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
The associate alleged "she was confused in stating she had a power of attorney." Id.
Cf. Hilton v. Upton, 204 So. 2d 352 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1967); Porterfield v. Porterfield,
2d 16 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965) (subsequent intent irrelevant to the establishment of the

legal effect of act).
82. 213 So. 2d 603 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
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nored the moral restriction issue and relied entirely on the Spark presumption to uphold survivorship rights in an account established by a
daughter and co-owned by her mother and brother. Upon opening the account the credit union3 treasurer explained to the parties that any signatory would be able to withdraw from the account at will and, upon the
death of any one of them, ownership would vest in the survivors. The court
noted the account was opened with "full knowledge of the legal affect of their
actions"8 4 and thus held the survivors' failure to use the account and the
depositor's retention of the only pass book inconsequential to the right of
85
survivorship.
Acceptance by the noncontributing co-tenant has also been a major
issue in determining the survivor's right to the funds remaining on deposit.8 6
In Dempss7 the noncontributing co-tenant's failure to accept, as illustrated
by their failure to withdraw, was held indicative of the depositor's failure
to surrender control. However, as noted above, the court in Ducote88 refused to find complete inaction by all parties to the account sufficient to
rebut the Spark presumption. In Maier v. Bean8 9 the court specifically held
that "the nonuse of this power does not . . . imply its nonexistence." Evidence in Maier indicated that the donee had not only failed to use the account but had also refused to accept the passbook until her prospective
marriage to the donor. In this regard the court held: 90
The evidence that she refused possession of the bank book [sic] and
that she personally never drew out any money does not clearly and
convincingly refute the presumption that she had the power to make
withdrawals before the contemplated marriage. At most, this evidence
is subject to ambiguous inferences.
However, in Wood v. McClellan,91 under a slightly different factual situation,
the court reached the opposite result. In that case the opening of a joint
account had been delayed by the donee upon the financial advice of a
bank official, after the donor had given her all the documents necessary to
complete the creation of the account. Since donative intent and surrender
of dominion were unquestioned, acceptance alone was the controlling
issue. The court observed that "although acceptance of a gift will generally

83. The court found the credit union to be outside the savings account legislation. See
text accompanying note 13 supra.
84. Graham v. Ducote Fed. Credit Union, 213 So. 2d 603, 605 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968)
(emphasis added).
85. The court noted that the passbook was not an indispensible document, since funds
could be withdrawn from the account without presenting it. Id. at 608.
86. See Wood v. McClellan, 247 So. 2d 77 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
87. Demps v. Graham, 157 So. 2d 534 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
88. 213 So. 2d 603, 605 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
89. 189 So. 2d 380 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
90. Id. at 384.
91. 247 So. 2d 77 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1971); see text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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be presumed, the presumption may be rebutted."9 2 Upon a finding that the
delay constituted a failure to accept, the court deemed the presumption
93
rebutted and the transaction an incomplete gift.
Only one Florida case has directly involved the rights of the survivor
where each party contributed the original deposit. In Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Association v. Lerner94 two males who were
sharing an apartment decided to open a joint account from which apartment
expenses would be paid. Each tenant continued to deposit and withdraw
funds during the life of an account. Shortly before his death one co-tenant
filled out a check, made payable to the account, but became too ill to make
the deposit. The survivor deposited the check before his co-tenant's death.
The federal district court routinely applied the Spark presumption and
found insufficient evidence to rebut it. The Fifth Circuit, however, chose
to distinguish Spark in the following manner: 95
In the case where both parties contribute funds to an account established for a special purpose, there is no presumption of gift logically
or under Florida law. If two parties contribute funds for some special
purpose, it is unlikely that they intended to make mutual gifts ....
It is more likely that such an account was established for the sake of
convenience only.
The court cited a hornbook statement on the law of gifts 96 adopting the
reverse position of the rule expressed in Spark as authority for this proposition. Moreover, the court cited North Shore Bank v. Shea97 for the proposition that Florida does not presume a gift in every survivorship agreement.
However, as noted earlier,98 the court in that case merely held that an issue
of fact existed that placed the Spark presumption in doubt and was sufficient
to bar the granting of a summary judgment. Furthermore, the Lerner court
interpreted Maier v. Bean99 to hold that: "the burden of proof was placed
upon the survivor in specific terms: 'What primarily needs to be shown in
these situations is the donor's intent to give the donee a present right of
ownership of a one-half undivided interest in the account.'-140 The court
then stated: "[E]ven where the funds concededly all belong to one of the

92. 247 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
93.

Id.

94. 401 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1968).
95. Id. at 441 (emphasis supplied by the court).
96. 38 C.J.S. Gifts §50 (1947). "Where the deposit by a person is in the name of himself
and another, not his wife, the presumption is that it was done for the purpose of convenience only, and this presumption is strengthened by the illness or infirmity of the
depositor." Id.
97. 148 So. 2d 60 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
98. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
99. 189 So. 2d 380 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
100. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Lerner, 401 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1968)

(emphasis supplied by the court).
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co-depositors, Florida law requires that the alleged donee must demonstrate
present donative intent before his right to the funds as survivor can be
established." 1° 1 However, the court in MaierO'-' had upheld the Spark presumption where a joint account with right of survivorship was established
with the funds of one person.
In circumstances less compelling than those in Lerner, such as where the
co-tenants are related, it may be very likely that a gift, at least at death, is
intended. Even without this intent a court could utilize the contract theory
to hold the survivor entitled to the funds, since each had furnished consideration for the rights acquired from the other. Consequently, while there is a
federal court decision holding that a presumption of convenience arises
where a joint account is formed by separate deposits of the co-tenants, the
reasoning does not seem to be founded on Florida law.
One additional case must be considered in determining the survivor's
rights after Sullivan.103 In Josephson v. Kuhner 0 4 a miserly, "disoriented"105 old man on his deathbed had created three joint accounts with right
of survivorship. Testimony taken at trial established that two of the accounts
had been created for the convenience of the depositor and the third was to
be payable to the survivor only "in the event of [the depositor's] death."106
Under Sullivan this evidence alone would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of present gift. However, the Josephson court chose to view all three
transactions as gifts causa mortis, rather than gifts inter vivos. The effect
was to block the invocation of the Sullivan presumption °7 and place the
burden of proving a valid gift causa mortis on the survivors ab initio.08
Bank Accounts Held by Husband and Wife
If the surviving member of a joint account is the spouse of the decedent
he may assert two arguments in addition to those available to other surviving
joint tenants. Either argument may be sufficient to sustain his rights to the
account. Briefly, they are: (1) the account was held by the entirety and (2)
the deposit by the husband is presumed to be a gift to the wife.
Florida's recognition of the common law estate by the entirety in personal
101. Id.
189 So. 2d 380 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
103. See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
102.
104.

139 So. 2d 440 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).

105. Id. at 442.
106. Id. at 445.
107. "Gifts causa mortis are not regarded with favor by the law, but are tested by
strict rules with which proof of compliance must be clear and convincing and owing to the
possibility of fraud, any relaxation of such rules is fraught with danger. The evidence
must be stronger and clearer than proof of a gift inter vivos, there being no presumption
of law either in favor of or against a gift causa mortis." Id. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
108. "In dealing with gifts, this jurisdiction has considered the question of burden of
proof in a number of cases, and has held that in some instances the burden rests upon
those receiving the gifts and in other instances upon those questioning the gifts. These

cases seemingly are bottomed upon the facts surrounding the gifts, the nature of the gifts,
and whether or not they are gifts inter vivos or gifts causa mortis." Id. at 443.
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property0 9 has caused the courts great difficulty, particularly with regard
to treatment of joint bank accounts.'1" Since an estate by the entirety is
"essentially a joint tenancy, modified by the common-law doctrine that the
huband and wife are one person,""' the Spark-Sullivan presumption is
applicable where an entirety was not asserted."12 Nevertheless, an estate by
the entirety, which is generally presumed if property is acquired specifically
in the name of husband and wife,"' s is thought to be more advantageous to
the surviving spouse, since section 689.15 of the Florida Statutes"14 expressly
exempts that estate from its requirements. This exemption preserves the
common law doctrine of survivorship, which operates to vest title in the
surviving spouse by operation of law." 5
While this advantage exists with regard to real property"8 and possibly
bank accounts in the names of "husband and wife"'- 7 (referred to as the
"conjunctive" form) it does not apply to accounts in the names of "husband
or wife""18 (referred to as the "disjunctive" form). The distinction seems to
be based on an entirety requirement known as the "unity of control""19
wherein each spouse must obtain the signature or consent of the other
before an attempted alienation of part or all of the account will be valid.
The practical inconvenience of an account requiring joint signatures before
withdrawals will be honored has prompted the creation of joint accounts

109. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1956); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 306,
103 So. 333, 334 (1925). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1971), where the court noted that there was some question whether such an estate did
exist at common law. For jurisdictions in which an estate by the entirety cannot be created
in personal property, see Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959).
110. See First Nat'l1 Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971); Winters v.
Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956).
111. English v. English, 66 Fla. 427, 431, 63 So. 822, 823 (1913).
112. See, e.g., Sharps v. Sharps, 214 So. 2d 492, 495 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Hilton v.
Upton, 204 So. 2d 352, 354 (ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
113. Losey v. Losey, 221 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1969); Powell v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915,
916 (Fla. 1952).
114. FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1969) states: "The doctrine of the right of survivorship in
cases of real estate and personal property held by joint tenants shall not prevail in this
state; that is to say, except in cases of estates by entirety, a devise, transfer or conveyance
heretofore or hereafter made to two or more shall create a tenancy in common, unless
the instrument creating the estate shall expressly provide for the right of survivorship; and
in cases of estates by the entirety, the tenants, upon divorce, shall become tenants in
common." (Emphasis added.)
115. For a history of this provision and a discussion of the effect it had on the doctrine of survivorship, see Florida Natl Bank v. Gann, 101 So. 2d 579 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958);
1 BoYEa §20.01 (2) (1969).
116. Losey v. Losey, 221 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1969).
117. See Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956). Cf. Wilbum v. Wilburn, 143 So.
2d 518, 521 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), where the court, in viewing jointly owned stock, held:
"In Florida, where property is purchased by a husband and conveyed to the husband and
wife jointly, an estate by the entireties is created .... "
118. First Nat'1 Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971).
119. This phrase seems to have been derived from the opinion in Hagerty v. Hagerty,
52 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1951).
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between husband and wife in the disjunctive form with a provision for
withdrawal on the individual or "alternative" signature of either. This
arrangement will permit withdrawal of the entire amount without the consent or even knowledge of the other.
Although some courts have held that an entirety cannot exist if the account authorizes either party to withdraw,1 20 Florida courts have refused to
accept this result as a matter of law.121 Instead, Florida courts have considered two distinct and possible alternative elements of an account to determine whether an entirety has been created: (1) the form of the creating
instrument and (2) the intent of the parties..122 Under the first consideration,
the instrument must reveal the existence of the common law unities peculiar
23
to the estate - the unities of possession, interest, time, title, and marriage.
Since the unities of time and title require that the interests of each spouse
2 4
must come into existence simultaneously and in the same instrument,
cases in which one spouse simply adds the name of his spouse to an account
originally in his name alone, or where a spouse creates a joint account with
his own funds, would appear to automatically negate the creation of an
entirety. Similarly, where either party may withdraw individually, the requirement of concert in alienation derived from the unity of possession of
the whole by each party, when read in connection with the unity of marriage,
will not be met,125 absent some showing of an agency agreement. 26 Nevertheless, Florida courts have allowed a showing of the intention of the parties
to create an estate by the entirety to substitute for unities found not to
exist. 2 7 Intention may be established by the inclusion of the term "jointly"
120. Marble v. Jackson, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N.E. 442 (1923).
121. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971). Such a ruling
has inherent complications, since it becomes increasingly difficult to determine who may
withdraw and for what purpose. See, e.g., Glassner v. Columbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
197 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1967) (one spouse allowed to recover from the bank funds withdrawn
by the other alone); Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank v. Adobe Brick & Supply Co., 232 So.
2d 29 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Beaty v. Beaty, 177 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965). See also
Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A Fla. 1954) (surviving spouse allowed to recover
funds withdrawn on the husband's signature alone and given to his brother).
122. As used in this context "intent" refers to the intent of the parties to establish
an estate by the entirety. However, donative intent in itself will clearly establish the right
of survivorship. See McGillen v. Gumpman, 171 So. 2d 69 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
123. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971). See also
Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 655, 21 So. 2d 205, 206 (1945); English v. English, 66
Fla. 427, 430-31, 63 So. 822, 823 (1913).
124. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971).
125. Glassner v. Columbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 197 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1967); Wilton
Manors Nat'l Bank v. Adobe Brick & Supply Co., 232 So. 2d 29 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
126. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971) (showing
of an agency agreement required); Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1951)
(agency agreement implied from signature card).
127. See, e.g., Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1956) (in discussing the unities,
the court omitted the unities of time and title); Wilburn v. Wilburn, 143 So. 2d 518, 521
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962) (the unities of time and title were necessarily lacking, since the
husband was the original owner; nevertheless, the court upheld the presumption of entirety). See also In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956); Hilton v. Upton, 204 So.
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in the signature card 128 or by the treatment of the account as an entirety
29
after its creation.
Two recent decisions by the Florida supreme court 3 0 now require both
elements of the estate (unities and intention) to exist before the entirety
will be upheld, except that an individual withdrawal is permitted if some
agency agreement is established, 3' and intent need not be proved if the
instrument expressly designates the account as an entirety. 3 2 These decisions,
in effect, hold that a joint account held in the disjunctive form between
husband and wife is presumed to be a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by
the entirety. Thus, the Spark and Sullivan decisions remain in full force
unless the entirety prerequisites can be established. While both cases can be
distinguished as not involving survivorship of bank accounts, they clearly
indicate the present disposition of the court on entireties. Consequently, an
assertion of an estate by the entirety now seems to be more difficult to
establish than a joint tenancy unless the drafter of the account had the
forethought to include entirety language.
Arguably, the rights of the surviving spouse are furthered by the wellrecognized presumption of gift whenever the husband transfers his individual
property to himself and his wife jointly."33 Since this presumption has been
applied to joint bank accounts, it is surprising that in several cases the presumption does not seem to have been argued. In Sharps v. Sharps'34 the
court held that the wife must establish all elements of a gift inter vivos

2d 352 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
128. In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39, 43 (Fla. 1956). On rehearing the court receded
from its original opinion and held the "rubber stamp notion" insufficient to show intent.
It seems more likely such language would create a joint tenancy. See, e.g., Awtry's Estate
v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955); Harrell v. Harrel, 231 So. 2d 793 (Miss.
1971); In re Gray's Estate, 27 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965).
129. Cf. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956). The court, ignoring the format
of the account, found the parties had not created an entirety simply because they never
treated the account in that fashion.
130. LaPierre v. Kalergis, 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply
Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971).
131. First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971).
132. Id.
133. Lapp v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Home v. Home, 247
So. 2d 99, 100 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971); Bergh v.Bergh, 127 So. 2d 481, 487 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1961). Transactions from wife to husband, however, are subject to entirely different rules.
See Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1971), where the court in discussing all
types of property jointly owned stated: "Once a wife initially makes it appear that her
separate funds supplied the entire consideration for the purchase of certain property, then,
the husband's record or 'paper' interest therein is in jeopardy. Under such circumstances
there is no presumption of a gift to the husband of his record interest therein; on the
contrary, the presumption arises that the husband is the trusee of a resulting trust with
the wife as the beneficiary thereof or that a special equity exists in her favor . .

.

. In

order to preserve his record interest the husband has the burden of establishing that a
gift was, in fact, intended ....."Id. at 214 (emphasis added). See also O'Shea v. O'Shea,
221 So. 2d 223 (ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969). But cf. Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825
(4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971) (holding such a distinction invalid under FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5).
134. 214 So. 2d 492 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/5

18

Stevens:OF
Survivorship
RightsREVIEW
in Joint Accounts [Vol. XXIV
UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA LAW
by clear and convincing evidence in order for her to retain funds given to
her by her husband before his death but deposited in their joint account
with right of survivorship after his death.1s Nevertheless, as to funds given
by the husband to the wife and deposited in the account before his death,
the court upheld a presumption of survivorship, not from the common law
doctrine associated with husband and wife but solely from the nature of
the joint account. 136 Thus, in this case the presumptions generally associated
with transactions between husband and wife were completely ignored.
BANK ACCOUNTS AFTER

1971

While the Spark and Sullivan decisions had the effect of merging the
joint tenancy, gift, and contract theories into what could be termed the
"joint ownership theory,' 137 the uncertainty surrounding the essential elements of the theory defies its uniform application." 3 The elements required
after the merger were not entirely irrelevant when viewed from the perspective
of their historical origin, but it was doubtful that they served any current
public policy. 13 Consequently, there existed great need for statutory relief,

135. Id.; cf. Lowry v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 42 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1949).
136. "Upon his death, in the twinkling of a legal eye, that check became an asset of
the husband's estate .... Also, upon his death the joint bank account became the wife's
account by right of survivorship . . . . Therefore, the deposit of the check by the wife
in the former joint account, after her husband's death, in the absence of prior instruction from him, would be proper only if the husband had made a gift of the check to her.
To establish such a gift, the wife would have the burden of so showing by clear and
satisfactory evidence .... " Sharps v. Sharps, 214 So. 2d 492, 495 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
137. The presumptions developed in Spark and Sullivan have been adopted by the
courts in joint ownership of securities as well. Thus, in Kuebler v. Kuebler, 131 So. 2d 211,
218 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), the court, following the Sullivan view observed: "When the
joint tenancy . . . with right of survivorship was first created a full and complete gift
intervivos was presumed, but such presumption could be rebutted and overcome by clear
and convincing evidence showing that the donor did not have a present donative intent
at the time the joint tenancy in the stock was created." See also Sullivan v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 230 So. 2d 18 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Coinciding with joint accounts, conveyances between husband and wife required a separate category. Compare Fuller v. Fuller,
215 So. 2d 507 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968) and Estate of Maxcy v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 192
(5th Cir. 1971) (acknowledging special presumptions rebuttable only by conclusive evidence),
with O'Shea v. O'Shea, 221 So. 2d 228 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (holding no presumption exists
in conveyances from wife to husband). See also Withlin v. Withlin, 153 So. 2d 70 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1963) (failing to distinguish between jointly held stock and realty).
138. See, e.g., note 73 supra. Whenever consideration is given to the intention of the
parties, uniform application cannot be achieved; each case must be decided on its individual circumstances. Where only present intent is to be considered to decide a testamentary result, courts may be inclined to stretch those circumstances to achieve an
equitable result. Such action defies predictability.
139. Arguably, survivorship in joint accounts may be upheld even though testamentary
in nature, since accounts are generally evidenced by written instruments of admitted genuineness that have been signed and delivered to a third party, thus reducing the danger
of fraud, perjury, or forgery. To deny cogency to these documents for lack of witnesses and
testimonial clauses would be to exault formalities that serve no useful purpose. See generally G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTs 41 (4th ed. 1963); Effiand, Estate
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particularly in the light of the judicial decisions handed down in the
140
"subsequent muddle."
In 1971 the Florida Legislature enacted section 659.291 of the Florida
Statutes to alleviate inequities and uncertainties created by the existing
case law. The statute is not restricted to particular accounts or institutions
and consequently applies to savings and checking accounts in all financial
institutions regulated under the banking code. 41 Accounts in specific savings
and loan associations, however, seem to remain subject to section 665.271
of the Florida Statutes.
The basic import of the new statute is to create a presumption of the
intent of the deceased co-tenant to vest title in the survivors of the joint
account upon his death.1 42 The presumption is made rebuttable only by: (1)
proof of fraud; (2) proof of undue influence; or (3) dear and convincing
proof of contrary intent.143 The absence of proof of "donative intent or delivery, possession, dominion, control or acceptance" 144 does not affect the
was "testamentary
rights of any party. Moreover, proof that the transaction
45
in nature" does not defeat the co-tenant's rights.
While the purpose of the statute is to provide another' 4 statutory exception to the Statute of Wills, 47 the wording of the statute raises some
doubt as to its effectiveness. For instance, the statutory presumption is one
of intent of a decedent to vest title in survivors at death. However, an intention to make a testamentary bequest alone would be insufficient to satisfy the requirements for testamentary dispositions.' 48 In any event, the allowance of proof of "contrary intent" may promote litigation similar to that

Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 507; Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint
Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 376 (1959); Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship
Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALiF. L. REv. 596 (1953); Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L. Rv. 103 (1953).
140. See text accompanying notes 73-108 supra.
141. Since Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166, uses only the general term
"bank," presumably the definition of "bank" for the banking code found in FLA. STAT.
§658.02 (1) (1969), is controlling. That definition states: "'Bank' means any person doing
a banking business whether subject to the law of this or any other jurisdiction . . . ."
However, a recent case would deny the application of this statute to tenancies by the
entirety: "Passage of this Act does not affect the tenancy by the entirety since it is a distinct form of proper ownership independent of, although in certain respects similar to,
a joint account." First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 n.1 (Fla.
1971) (dictum).
142. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291 (1), at 1166.
143. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659-291 (2), at 1166.
144. Id. The inclusion of the phrase would seem to constitute a repeal of the Sullivan
doctrine. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
145. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291 (2), at 1166.
146. See FLA STAT. §665.271 (1969); Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-126, §689.075 (2), at 323.
See also Litsey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 243 So. 2d 239 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
147. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166 (indicating the presumption is one
of "vesting upon death").
148. FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1969). Cf. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d
112 (Fla. 1960).
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under Sullivan.1 49 The "contrary intent" clause was apparently included
to allow a showing of mistake or misunderstanding in the use of standard
forms in the opening of joint accounts where testamentary disposition was
not intended. However, to make the "absence of proof" 150 immaterial is not
to foreclose affirmative proof of factors establishing contrary intent - proof
of no donative intent, delivery, transfer of possession, relinquishment of
dominion and control or acceptance - any of which may be held sufficient
to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the Spark and Sullivan decisions
may still be viable.
Legislative concern regarding the constitutionality of section 659.291
is reflected in the statute by the inclusion of two savings clauses. The first
protects all parts of the statute not held to be unconstitutional if part of
the statute should fail.1 5' Second, the statute expressly preserves section
659.29.. 52 Since that provision parallels section 659.291 with regard to the
rights of banking institutions, its sole utility is to provide a reserve assurance that banks will be protected should section 659.291 he held unconstitutional in its entirety.
The new statute is not to be applied retrospectively to accounts in existence at the time it was enacted.153 The effect is to deny current depositors
the very relief the statute was designed to provide. Fear of unconstitutionality
again seems to be the reason for this restriction of the statute's application.
Such zealous security measures may well encourage constitutional attacks.
CONCLUSION

Since sections 659.291 and 665.271 are placed in obscure chapters with
regard to their direct effect on rights of individuals, 54 the provisions
will not be readily discoverable by the general practitioner, much less
laymen subject to their terms. Consequently, present legislation should be
evaluated with a view to the customary usage of joint accounts. Generally
speaking, depositors create such accounts for one or more of the following
reasons:1 55

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
71-126,

See note 138 supra.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291 (2), at 1166.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291 (3), at 1167.
Compare Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166, with Fla. Laws 1971, ch.
§689.075 (2), at 323 (enacted to apply to certain trusts "heretofore or hereafter

established at any bank or savings and loan association by one or more persons . .

This inconsistency seems to be unwarranted. See also N.Y.

BANKING LAW

").

§675 (b) (McKinney

1964).
154. Both chapters 659 and 665 apply to banking and savings institutions, respectively,
and do not generally concern, at least directly, the rights of individuals dealing with those
institutions.
155. See Kepner, The joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a
Name, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1953).
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(1) to facilitate expenditure of the depositor's funds only for his convenience;
(2) to retain lifetime control over funds intended to pass to another
at death;
(3) to avoid the expense and inconvenience of legal aid in drafting
or changing a will;
(4) to make cash immediately available to survivors upon the death of
the family benefactor.
In light of the first reason, it is dear section 665.271 creates inequities
incapable of rectification due to its conclusive presumption. In its more
recent enactment the legislature recognized the difficulties with the rigidity
of a conclusive presumption and made the parallel presumption in section
659.291 at least qualifiedly rebuttable. Since the distinction between savings
accounts in savings associations and savings accounts in banks does not
seem sufficient to justify presumptions that differ dramatically, the conclusive presumption in section 665.271 should now be limited 5 8 or amended
to conform to the presumption in section 659.291. s5
Other reasons for creating a joint account contemplate a type of testamentary transfer. Sections 665.271 and 659.291 could conceivably be held
ineffective in supporting this result, for each statute provides only a presumption of intent to vest title that, by itself, may not be sufficient to constitute an exception to the Statute of Wills. Further legislative efforts should
avoid this weakness. Additionally, the applicability of sections 665.271 and
659.291 should be limited to the institutions that are governed by their
respective chapters and should not pertain to the rights of depositors. Instead, a single statutory provision similar to the following should be included
in chapter 689 of the Florida Statutes'5 s to protect the rights of depositors:
156. An absolute rule, while inflexible and therefore subject to misapplication of a
depositor's intent, may nevertheless be justified where the cost of litigation approaches the
amount on deposit. Consequently, the statute could be supportable if the conclusive presumption were limited to accounts not in excess of $5,000. See, e.g., M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, §515 (2) (1971).
157. Legislatures in New York and California enacted "conclusive presumption" statutes
that were made applicable to accounts in all financial institutions. N.Y. BANKiNG LAW
§239 (McKinney 1940); CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. Act 652, §15 (a) (Deering 1937). In connection
with these statutes, see Heiner v. Greenwich Say. Bank, 118 Misc. 326, 193 N.Y.S. 291 (Sup.
Ct. 1922); Hill v. Badeljy, 107 Cal. App. 598, 290 P. 637 (1st Dist. 1930), respectively.
Both statutes, however, were repealed and replaced by less stringent provisions, although
the new provisions still seem to allow the attempted testamentary transfer where intended.
N.Y. BANUNG LAw §675 (b) (McKinney 1971); CAL. FIN. CoDE §§852, 7602 (West 1968).
See, e.g., In re Leisner, 19 N.Y.2d 869, 227 N.E.2d 593, 280 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1967); Poerch v.
Eldridge, 36 App. Div. 2d 193, 319 N.Y.S.2d 749 (4th Dep't 1971). At least one state still
possesses a conclusive presumption statute. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §909 (1970).

158. While chapter 689 of the Florida Statutes is not the ideal location of such a
statute, it nevertheless may be acceptable for that chapter presently contains the Totten
trust provision. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-126, §689.075 (2), at 323, which is similar in effect
to FLA. STAT. §665.271 (1969) and Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, §659.291, at 1166. See also
ALA. CODE tit. 5, §128 (2) (a) (1969) (statute made applicable to all types of accounts held

jointly in the name of two or more persons).
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Accounts in Two or More Names. When a savings or bank account
in any banking institution or savings association transacting business in
this state is (1) opened in the names of two or more persons; (2) made
payable to either or the survivor or survivors; and (3) evidenced by a
written document, signed by all depositors and at least one bank official
or employee, the opening shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be prima facie evidence in any action or proceeding to which
the survivor or survivors are a party, of the vesting of title in the survivor
or survivors as absolute owner or owners of all funds remaining in the
account upon the death of any party whose name appears on the account.
For the purpose of the preceding sentence, the failure of any depositor to
surrender control over the funds deposited or to possess present donative
intent shall be deemed immaterial. Furthermore, the rights of all parties
shall be upheld notwithstanding proof that the account was solely testamentary in nature. 159
The above statute would substantially comply with the protective principles
behind the Statute of Wills and would generally accord recognition to the
testamentary intent of the depositor while protecting the intentions of those
who use the account for convenience only. Without such a statutory amendment, the estates of depositors may still be subject to needless litigation.
Ric-iAsu B. STEPHENS, JR.

159. To insure public knowledge of the requirements for creating the "testimonial"
account, all financial institutions should be required under §665.271 of the Florida Statutes
to follow the same procedural steps before availing themselves of the conclusive presumption, designed to protect against double liability upon payment to a survivor.
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